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CREDIBILITY AND WAR POWERS 
Ganesh Sitaraman∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In late August 2013, after Syrian civilians were horrifically at-
tacked with sarin gas, President Barack Obama declared his intention 
to conduct limited airstrikes against the Syrian regime of President  
Bashar al-Assad.  A year earlier, President Obama had announced that 
the use of chemical weapons was “red line” for the United States.1  
Advocates for military action now argued that if the credibility of 
American threats diminished, dictators would have license to act with 
impunity.2  President Obama himself seemed to embrace this justifica-
tion for action.  “The international community’s credibility is on the 
line,” he said in early September.  “And America and Congress’s credi-
bility is on the line.”3 
For all the talk of credibility, political scientists have offered devas-
tating critiques of credibility arguments in the context of military 
threats.  They have demonstrated not only that the concept is often 
deployed in incomplete and illogical ways but also that as a historical 
matter, a country’s “credibility” based on its reputation and past ac-
tions has little or no effect on the behavior of opponents in high-stakes 
international crises.  In the crises in the run-up to World War I, in the 
Berlin crises of the late 1950s and early 1960s, and even in the crises 
leading to World War II, threats from countries that had previously 
backed down were not seen as less credible by their opponents.  In 
some cases, the threats were even thought to be more credible. 
For constitutional lawyers, this research should be particularly 
troubling because credibility has migrated from foreign policy into the 
constitutional law of war powers.  In a series of opinions, including on 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School.  Thanks to Jack Goldsmith, Richard 
Re, Suzanna Sherry, Matt Waxman, Ingrid Wuerth, and David Zionts for helpful comments and 
conversations. 
 1 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps (Aug. 
20, 2012), available at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white 
-house-press-corps. 
 2 Michael Crowley, The Two Big Reasons Obama Might Strike Syria, TIME SWAMPLAND 
(Aug. 26, 2013), http://swampland.time.com/2013/08/26/the-two-big-reasons-obama-might-strike 
-syria. 
 3 Jennifer Epstein, President Obama: America’s Credibility on the Line in Syria, POLITICO 
(Sept. 4, 2013, 4:25 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/obama-america-credibility-syria 
-96254.html. 
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Somalia (1992), Haiti (2004), and Libya (2011), the Justice Depart-
ment’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has argued that the credibility 
of the United Nations Security Council is a “national interest” that can 
justify presidential authority to use military force without prior con-
gressional authorization.4  This Essay argues that the credibility justi-
fication for the use of force should be removed from the constitutional 
law of presidential war powers.  Incorporating credibility as one of the 
“national interests” that justify presidential use of force expands the 
President’s war powers significantly without a legitimate policy justifi-
cation. 
I.  UNDERSTANDING CREDIBILITY 
As a justification for the use of military force, the preservation of 
credibility is ubiquitous in foreign policy.  President Clinton thought 
that if the United States failed to uphold its commitments in Somalia 
after the Black Hawk Down incident, then “[o]ur own credibility with 
friends and allies would be severely damaged.  Our leadership in 
world affairs would be undermined . . . .”5  President Reagan argued 
that if the United States failed to confront guerrillas in Central Ameri-
ca, “our credibility would collapse.”6  Years earlier, President Truman 
said that defeat in Korea “would be an open invitation to new acts of 
aggression elsewhere.”7  For decades during the Cold War, credibility 
arguments were prominent in game theory analyses of deterrence, 
arms control, and U.S.-Soviet relations.8  Despite the importance of 
these theories, political scientists at the time acknowledged that they 
“know remarkably little” about credibility9 and had “neither theoreti-
cally grounded expectations nor solid evidence” of how behavior af-
fects expectations of future action.10  More recently, political scientists 
have turned to serious study of credibility.  These studies call into 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 4 Auth. to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C., 2011 WL 1459998, at *10 (Apr. 1, 
2011) [hereinafter Libya Opinion]; Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Haiti, 28 Op. O.L.C., 
2004 WL 5743940, at *4 (Mar. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Haiti Opinion]; Auth. to Use U.S. Military 
Forces in Som., 16 Op. O.L.C. 6, 11 (1992) [hereinafter Somalia Opinion]. 
 5 JONATHAN MERCER, REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 4–5 (1996) (quot-
ing Clinton’s Words on Somalia: ‘The Responsibilities of American Leadership,’ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
8, 1993, at A15). 
 6 Id. at 2 (quoting President Reagan’s Address on Central America to Joint Session of Con-
gress, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1983, at A12) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 7 Id. (quoting JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT 110 (1982)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 8 See, e.g., HERMAN KAHN, ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR (1960); THOMAS C. 
SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE (1966).  
 9 Robert Jervis, Deterrence and Perception, INT’L SECURITY, Winter 1982/1983, at 3, 8. 
 10 Id. at 9. 
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question the use of credibility arguments in the context of military 
threats. 
A.  Theories of Credibility 
The credibility of a threat is “the perceived likelihood that the 
threat will be carried out if the conditions that are supposed to trigger 
it are met.”11  When people believe a threat will be carried out, it is 
credible; when they believe it is a bluff, the threat is not credible.  
Credibility is an audience’s perception.  If the United States thinks its 
threats are credible, but opponents do not, then the threats are not 
credible.  Credibility is also not universal.  Different actors might as-
sess the credibility of a threat differently — and different individuals 
within the same government might debate the credibility of a threat.12 
Political scientists have identified five different theories by which 
people perceive threats as credible.  The most prominent — and the 
one consistently invoked as “credibility” in foreign policy debates from 
Vietnam to Syria — is the past actions theory.13  The past actions theo-
ry links credibility to a country’s historical record of fulfilling its 
threats.  It has two central claims: First, credibility is determined by 
the historical evidence of a country’s actions.  Second, there is a direct 
relationship between the perception that a country historically follows 
through on its commitments and the country’s credibility.  The theo-
ry’s rationale is that past actions might illustrate something important 
about the adversary’s character, interests, or capacity to act.  But the 
core of the theory is narrower: the likelihood of a country following 
through on a threat today is dependent on whether the country fol-
lowed through on its threats in the past. 
Commentators have also frequently offered a variation of the past 
actions theory of credibility that focuses on reputation arguments.14  A 
reputation is a “judgment of someone’s character (or disposition) that 
is then used to predict or explain future behavior.”15  Reputation ar-
guments in international politics assume that decisionmakers attribute 
behavior to character or dispositional traits, rather than to situational 
factors (such as national interests, public pressure, or military capabili-
ties).  When decisions are attributed to situation, the assumption is 
that most people in the same situation would act the same way.  When 
decisions are attributed to disposition, it means that this individual ac-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 11 DARYL G. PRESS, CALCULATING CREDIBILITY: HOW LEADERS ASSESS MILITARY 
THREATS 10 (2005). 
 12 Id. at 10–11. 
 13 Discussion of the past actions theory draws heavily on PRESS, supra note 11, at 11–12.  
 14 Discussion of the reputation theory of credibility draws heavily on MERCER, supra note 5, 
at 6–7. 
 15 Id. at 6. 
  
126 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 127:123 
 
tor will behave a certain way, independent of the situation.  Note that 
the reputation and past actions theories are not exactly the same: A na-
tion’s past actions may lead to a reputation if others interpret its be-
havior in dispositional rather than situational terms and then use that 
past conduct to predict similar behavior in the future.  A nation’s rep-
utation, however, might also be ascribed to other dispositional traits 
(such as ideological commitments or inherent characteristics). 
The leading alternative to the past actions and reputation theories 
of credibility is the current calculus theory.16  Current calculus theory 
holds that credibility is not a function of past actions or reputation, but 
rather a function of a country’s present capabilities and interests in a 
particular situation.  On this theory, an adversary assesses credibility 
based on the country’s ability to effectuate its threat and the costs and 
benefits to that country in enforcing its threat.  Two other theories are 
worth noting.  The ingrained lessons theory holds that decisionmakers 
do not look to the threatening country’s history, but instead to their 
own history.  For example, they will expect today’s adversary to back 
down if their previous adversaries also backed down.  The never again 
theory holds that breaking a commitment actually increases credibility 
of future threats because decisionmakers will understand that backing 
down a second time is too costly. 
This Essay focuses on the past actions and reputation theories, and 
given their dominance in foreign policy, refers to them together as 
“credibility arguments.” 
B.  The Logical Limits of Credibility Arguments 
In the context of military threats and the use of force, credibility 
arguments suffer from some important limitations.  First, because both 
past actions and reputation are based on audience interpretations, a 
country can have multiple reputations and a single action can create 
different reputations among different audiences.17  To some, following 
through on a threat demonstrates resolve; to others, foolishness.  Se-
cond, action in one context might not migrate into reputation in anoth-
er.18  If the United States sets a “red line” on a fishing issue for Micro-
nesia and then backs down, it is unlikely to send a signal to Iran that 
all American “red lines” are bluffs.  The Iranians may ignore the Mi-
cronesian case because it is fundamentally different from their own. 
Third, if we assume that credibility matters, then both sides know 
that it matters, and both sides can take it into account.  Social scien-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 Discussion of the three remaining theories of credibility draws heavily on PRESS, supra note 
11, at 20–29. 
 17 See MERCER, supra note 5, at 7. 
 18 See George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 
31 J. LEGAL STUD. S95, S102–09 (2002). 
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tists call the resulting problem recursion,19 but we generally know it as 
the “if she knows that I know that she knows . . .” problem.  Take Syr-
ia.20  If we assume Assad is simpleminded, and the United States 
backs down, then Assad will think he can use chemical weapons 
again.  But if Assad also knows that credibility is important, and the 
United States backs down, then Assad knows President Obama has 
paid a reputation cost in bluffing.  Perhaps some in the United States 
will even say “never again!”  If Assad then uses chemical weapons 
again, it will be harder for Obama to bluff a second time.  As a result, 
backing down the first time actually makes any future threat by 
Obama more credible.  And Assad knows this.  Now take it one step 
further.  If Assad knows that Obama knows this, then Assad will rea-
son that Obama’s threat is a bluff because Obama knows Assad will 
think Obama’s action is more credible.  “Keeping the logic straight is 
difficult,” as Jonathan Mercer puts it, “but it is also irrelevant: no one 
knows how many rounds the game will go on, for there is no logical 
place to stop.”21  Credibility arguments are self-defeating because if we 
assume they matter, everyone else knows they matter too — and can 
account for them.  Because the recursion game goes on ad infinitum, it 
is impossible to determine what policy to pursue. 
C.  Evidence from History 
Credibility arguments could also be justified with real world evi-
dence.  For example, data could shed light on the manner of leaders’ 
credibility determinations: Do they actually pay attention to the dispo-
sition of the opponent based on their past actions?  Or do they under-
take a current calculus and focus on interests, capabilities, and the 
immediate situational context? 
In a series of qualitative studies, political scientists have shown that 
past actions and reputation theories of credibility have little historical 
basis for support.22  When leaders evaluate their opponents, they as-
sess threats based on current calculations, not on past actions.  And 
when leaders have justified conflicts based on preserving a reputation 
for resolve, others have not always interpreted their actions as was in-
tended.  Note that these studies are limited to the context of military 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 Jonathan Mercer, Bad Reputation, FOREIGN AFF. (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www 
.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136577/jonathan-mercer/bad-reputation. 
 20 Mercer applies recursion to Syria along these lines.  See id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 There are also some quantitative studies, which have mixed findings.  As Professor Daryl 
Press notes, these studies suffer from selection effects problems because “aggressors disproportion-
ately challenge those they expect will back down.”  PRESS, supra note 11, at 15; see also  
Douglas M. Gibler, The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation, 52 J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 426, 430–31 (2008). 
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threats and international crises.  Scholars hypothesize that military 
threats might differ from other contexts because the stakes are so high 
that leaders analyze the situation instead of using heuristics like repu-
tation.23  These findings therefore do not extend to all international  
issues.24 
In the most extensive research on credibility theories, Professor 
Daryl Press reviewed thousands of pages of archival documents and 
found that the current calculus theory, not the past action theory, best 
explains decisionmaking in the “appeasement crises” of the 1930s, the 
Berlin crises of the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the deliberations 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  On the past actions theory, the Nazis 
should have interpreted British and French threats as not credible be-
cause the Allies repeatedly backed down when Germany took aggres-
sive steps in the 1930s.  The historical evidence, however, shows that 
German leaders believed British and French threats were credible — 
even after the Allies backed down.  For the German leaders, credibility 
was a function of the Allies’ power, not their reputation.  Indeed, Press 
finds that German leaders almost never referenced past actions by the 
British and French.  Accordingly, he concludes that appeasement was 
poor strategy not because the Allies undermined their credibility, but 
because it allowed Germany to increase its power.25 
From 1958 to 1961, the world watched a number of Berlin crises 
unfold between the Soviets and the West.  Soviet Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev set six-month deadlines for the Allies to withdraw from 
West Berlin, and he threatened to cut off access to the city.  Yet every 
time, Khrushchev backed down.  On the past actions theory, British 
and American leaders should have interpreted each successive threat 
as less credible.  However, Press found that Soviet threats actually be-
came more credible, not less credible.26  During this same period, the 
Soviets expanded their nuclear arsenal; as their nuclear prowess grew, 
so did their credibility.  Indeed, by the time of the Cuban Missile Cri-
sis, American leaders strongly believed that Khrushchev would not 
back down if the United States acted in Cuba.  Here too Press finds 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 23 PRESS, supra note 11, at 6. 
 24 Reputation’s role in international law has long been debated.  See, e.g., JACK L.  
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (expressing 
skepticism); Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 231 (2009) 
(dissecting the concept); Andrew T. Guzman, Reputation and International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 379 (2006) (defending reputation). 
 25 See PRESS, supra note 11, at 42–79; Daryl G. Press, The Credibility of Power: Assessing 
Threats During the “Appeasement” Crises of the 1930s, INT’L SECURITY,Winter 2004/2005,  
at 136. 
 26 See PRESS, supra note 11, at 80–116.  
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that British and American leaders almost never mentioned  
Khrushchev’s record of bluffing.27 
In an important book on reputation, Mercer analyzed the crises 
leading up to World War I.28  He finds that decisionmakers interpreted 
their adversaries’ backing down based more on the specific situational 
context, rather than on the disposition of the actors.29  Thus, when the 
Germans backed down, the Triple Entente of Britain, France, and 
Russia attributed those defeats to situational factors.  To the extent 
they considered past actions, the Entente believed Germany would be 
more likely to follow through on its threats in the future because it had 
previously been defeated.  Note also that both Press’s and Mercer’s 
cases stack the deck in favor of past actions theory: the players were 
the same, there were repeated crises in a short period of time, and the 
crises involved the same issues.  These are precisely the situations in 
which we would expect past action theories of credibility to be most 
powerful at explaining behavior. 
Looking specifically at military actions justified by credibility ar-
guments, political scientists have also provided historical evidence that 
allies and adversaries do not necessarily interpret these actions as en-
hancing America’s reputation or credibility.  In a study of the Korean 
War, Mercer recounts how Secretary of State Dean Acheson believed 
that Western European allies were at “near-panic” over whether the 
United States would act.30  They were not.  When the British Cabinet 
met to discuss the issue, Korea was fourth on their agenda and some of 
the ministers could not locate Korea on the map.31  Meanwhile, the 
French were concerned that the Americans would be too resolute.  
They worried that the United States would start a world war over 
what they saw as an area that was strategically unimportant.32  In an-
other study, Professor Ted Hopf analyzed the Soviet reaction to the 
United States’s withdrawal from Vietnam.  Hopf found that the Sovi-
ets did not see United States withdrawal as decreasing American cred-
ibility in the Cold War.33 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 See id. at 117–41. 
 28 This discussion draws on MERCER, supra note 5. 
 29 See id. at 213.  
 30 Jonathan Mercer, Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War, 67 INT’L ORG. 221, 234 (2013) 
(quoting Notes Regarding Meeting with Congressional Leaders, June 27, 1950 (June 27, 1950) (on 
file with the Harry S. Truman Library, Harry S. Truman Administration File, Elsey Papers)). 
 31 Id. at 235. 
 32 See id. at 236–37. 
 33 TED HOPF, PERIPHERAL VISIONS (1994).  The limits of this research are discussed in 
PRESS, supra note 11, at 16. 
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II.  CREDIBILITY AND PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 
Despite the widespread use of credibility arguments in foreign poli-
cy, political scientists have convincingly argued that these arguments 
suffer from logical flaws and have no significant basis in historical evi-
dence when it comes to military threats.  Nonetheless, these arguments 
have migrated into constitutional debates on war powers, and  
“credibility” has become an important justification for presidential war 
powers. 
A.  The Scope of Presidential War Powers 
The scope of the President’s power to order the use of military 
force without congressional approval is unclear as a matter of law.  
The original meaning of the Constitution’s provisions related to war 
and peace are seriously debated, the Supreme Court has never issued 
an opinion that delineates the specific scope of presidential war pow-
ers, and Congress and the President have not come to an agreement on 
the exact scope of these powers.34  For practical purposes, the relevant 
legal framework comes from OLC in the Department of Justice.  OLC 
has issued a number of opinions addressing the authority of the Presi-
dent to use force absent congressional approval.35  These opinions seek 
to determine when the use of force amounts to “war,” which for consti-
tutional purposes requires congressional authorization, and they rely 
heavily on historical practice and prior legal reasoning.36  OLC’s opin-
ions also identify credibility — particularly the credibility of the Unit-
ed Nations Security Council — as one element that contributes to the 
President’s independent constitutional authority to use force abroad. 
The OLC’s 2011 opinion on the President’s authority to use mili-
tary force in Libya is the most recent statement.37  The Libya Opinion 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 34 The literature is voluminous, but for a flavor of these debates, see LOUIS FISHER, PRESI-
DENTIAL WAR POWER (3d ed. 2013); JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE (2005); 
and David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — 
Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 720, 761–
66, 770 (2008).  As an interpretive matter, I follow the OLC’s basic pragmatism, recognizing some 
limitations on presidential war powers.  See, e.g., Marty Lederman, The Constitution, the Charter, 
and Their Intersection, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 1, 2013, 1:21 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013 
/09/01/syria-insta-symposium-marty-lederman-part-constitution-charter-intersection (describing a  
“Clinton/Obama ‘third way’” on war powers).  Of course, this approach is deeply contested.  
Compare YOO, supra (arguing for expansive presidential powers), with JOHN HART ELY, WAR 
AND RESPONSIBILITY (1993) (arguing for expansive congressional authority). 
 35 See, e.g., Libya Opinion, supra note 4, at *10; Haiti Opinion, supra note 4, at *4; Somalia 
Opinion, supra note 4, at 11. 
 36 For a recent discussion of historical practice, see Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, 
Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012); and Curtis A. 
Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1097 (2013). 
 37 Libya Opinion, supra note 4. 
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sets forth a two-prong framework for assessing the President’s authori-
ty to use force, absent congressional authorization.  First, the military 
operation must serve “sufficiently important national interests” to jus-
tify presidential action based on the Commander-in-Chief and Chief 
Executive powers and the President’s authority to conduct foreign re-
lations.38  Second, the military operation must have an anticipated “na-
ture, scope, and duration” that does not constitute “war.”39  For pur-
poses of credibility arguments, the national interest prong is the 
relevant element, and recent OLC legal opinions identify three differ-
ent categories of “national interest” that can justify the President’s in-
dependent authority to use force.  Note that OLC opinions, such as the 
Libya Opinion, generally state that a combination of interests creates 
sufficient foundation for presidential action;40 as a result, it is not clear 
whether some of these interests can independently provide a sufficient 
basis for presidential action. 
The narrowest and least controversial category of national interest 
is the power to repel attacks on the United States41 and to “protect the 
lives and property of Americans abroad.”42  OLC opinions on presi-
dential action in Iran (1980), Somalia (1992), Bosnia (1995), Haiti 
(2004), and Libya (2011) all reference this narrow authority,43 as do a 
1941 Attorney General opinion44 and the 1860 case, Durand v. 
Hollins.45 
More recently, OLC has identified “preservation of regional stabil-
ity” as a possible national interest in its Libya (2011), Haiti (2004), and 
Bosnia (1995) opinions.  The boundaries of the regional category are 
slippery, particularly as Presidents can argue that “regional stability” is 
vital, even in regions that may be of comparatively little strategic val-
ue to the United States. 
The final category is the United States’ interest in “maintaining the 
credibility of United Nations Security Council decisions.”46  In the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 38 Id. at *10.  
 39 Id. 
 40 See id. 
 41 See, e.g., Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863) (“If a war be made by invasion of a 
foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force . . . without 
waiting for any special legislative authority.”). 
 42 Presidential Powers Relating to the Situation in Iran, 4A Op. O.L.C. 115, 121 (1979) [here-
inafter Iran Opinion].  
 43 Libya Opinion, supra note 4; Haiti Opinion, supra note 4; Proposed Deployment of United 
States Armed Forces into Bosnia, 29 Op. O.L.C. 327 (1995) [hereinafter Bosnia Opinion]; Somalia 
Opinion, supra note 4; Iran Opinion, supra note 42. 
 44 Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 58, 62 (1941). 
 45 8 F. Cas. 111, 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186). 
 46 Libya Opinion, supra note 4, at *12 (quoting Bosnia Opinion, supra note 43, at 333) (inter-
nal quotation mark omitted); see also Haiti Opinion, supra note 4, at *4 (quoting Somalia Opin-
ion, supra note 4, at 11). 
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Libya Opinion, the OLC quoted President Obama as saying that “[t]he 
writ of the United Nations Security Council would have been shown 
to be little more than empty words, crippling that institution’s future 
credibility to uphold global peace and security.”47  It concluded that 
the President could find this a “substantial national foreign policy  
objective.”48 
OLC opinions from Somalia (1992), Haiti (2004), and Libya (2011) 
all root the U.N. credibility argument in the Truman Administration’s 
opinion authorizing the use of military force in Korea.49  That opinion 
noted that if the United States did not take action, then the United 
Nations would have “ceased to exist as a serious instrumentality for 
the maintenance of international peace,”50 and it stated that the “con-
tinued existence of the United Nations as an effective international or-
ganization is a paramount United States interest.”51  Despite frequent 
citation, the Korea Opinion — and other Cold War–era opinions — 
actually do not rely on credibility arguments.52  Instead, they focus on 
enforcing collective security agreements53 or on the President’s respon-
sibility to “Take Care” that the laws, including treaties, be “faithfully 
executed.”54  Importantly, this shift from the “Take Care” argument to 
a “credibility” argument turns a legal argument about treaty obliga-
tions into a policy argument about U.S. interests. 
B.  The Case Against Credibility 
The OLC’s policy argument that reliance on the credibility of the 
United Nations Security Council is a legitimate “national interest” that 
justifies presidential action without prior congressional approval is 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 47 Libya Opinion, supra note 4, at *12 (alteration in original) (quoting President Barack 
Obama, Address at the National Defense University (Mar. 28, 2011)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 48 Id. (quoting Somalia Opinion, supra note 4, at 12). 
 49 Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea (July 3, 1950), in 23 DEP’T ST. 
BULL. 173, 176–77 (1950). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 177. 
 52 To the extent that the Korea opinion involved the “effectiveness” of the United Nations, it 
might be better interpreted in light of the broader context: the failure of the League of Nations, 
the recent establishment of the United Nations, and the Korea situation as the first major test of 
the institution.  In this context, the “effectiveness” interest is less about the “credibility” of the 
United Nations in terms of past actions or reputation, and more about ensuring the continued 
existence of the infant organization. 
 53 See, e.g., Leonard C. Meeker, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of 
Viet-Nam, 54 DEP’T ST. BULL. 474, 480–82 (1966) [hereinafter Vietnam Opinion]; Iran Opinion, 
supra note 42, at 186. 
 54 This argument is controversial.  See Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic 
Separation of Powers, 99 VA. L. REV. 987, 1023–27 (2013); Jane E. Stromseth, Collective Force 
and Constitutional Responsibility: War Powers in the Post–Cold War Era, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
145, 153–56 (1995); Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (2008).  
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troubling.  Political science research, basic logical reasoning about 
credibility, and concerns about future OLC expansion of the “credibil-
ity” category all suggest that credibility arguments should be left out of 
the constitutional law of war powers. 
First, research in political science has demonstrated that credibility 
arguments are logically problematic and without serious historical 
support.  Constitutional doctrine should not rest on such logically and 
factually flawed premises.  All the other justifications for independent 
presidential authority have at least arguable policy justifications.  The 
defensive interests in repelling attacks and protecting American lives 
and property abroad rely on the country’s obligation to protect its citi-
zens.  The regional interest, while certainly broader and opaque in its 
boundaries, can be justified on policy grounds.  When the Bosnia 
Opinion (1995) referenced the American national interest in European 
security and stability, it was in the context of the recent end of a  
half-century-long Cold War that divided Europe — which itself was 
the product of a half-century defined by two world wars that began in 
Europe and led to American involvement.55  Case by case, regional ar-
guments can be contested, but they at least offer the possibility of a 
policy justification.  Credibility arguments are on a far weaker  
foundation. 
To be sure, one might argue that that there is a difference between 
national credibility, which political scientists have investigated, and 
the credibility of international institutions.  While the actor is different, 
the distinctions are minor.  An international institution’s likelihood of 
acting in any given situation is understood ex ante to be a function, at 
least in part, of its procedures and decision rules.  The U.N. Security 
Council, for example, is famously limited by the permanent five’s veto 
powers.  If anything, this fact means that past actions and reputational 
credibility theories will almost invariably be weaker when applied to 
the United Nations, as compared to a single country, because action 
depends on multinational agreement.  
Second, the United States interest in the “credibility” of the U.N. 
Security Council is questionable on its own terms.  The Libya Opinion 
states that the United States is not required to act when the Security 
Council has authorized action.56  The OLC has also explicitly recog-
nized that the United States may use force without Security Council 
authorization.57  The opinions thus allow the United States to abandon 
the credibility of the Security Council if the United States does not 
want to use force.  This might not be too troubling, as it is surely pos-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 55 Bosnia Opinion, supra note 43. 
 56 Libya Opinion, supra note 4, at *12. 
 57 Haiti Opinion, supra note 4, at *4. 
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sible for the President to have authority to act, but choose not to use it.  
But for those who defend the U.N. credibility argument, it should be 
extremely troubling that the United States can abandon the credibility 
of the Security Council if the U.N. does not authorize force and the 
United States wants to act anyway.  Because the U.N. Charter’s provi-
sions limit the use of force in the absence of self-defense or a Security 
Council resolution,58 U.S. action without U.N. authorization would ac-
tually undermine the United Nations’ credibility.  In other words, 
OLC is trying to have it both ways. 
Third, the presence of credibility arguments in OLC opinions cre-
ates a risk that future opinions will build on these flawed founda-
tions — expanding credibility from the U.N. to the nation’s credibility 
more generally.  The Kosovo case provides an example of creep in 
precedent.  In the Libya Opinion, OLC referred to the 1999 Kosovo 
action as a “precedent.”  In public discourse, Kosovo was justified in 
part on the credibility of NATO (there was no U.N. resolution for Ko-
sovo).59  If the Kosovo action is now “precedent,” it is possible that fu-
ture OLC lawyers will expand the credibility justification to NATO, 
other international organizations,60 or maybe even to the credibility of 
the United States’ threats.  The expansion of the credibility argument 
in constitutional doctrine is troubling because it could allow Presidents 
to bootstrap themselves into war.  If the president knows that she can 
act independently to engage America in a conflict if there is a credibil-
ity interest at stake, then she has an incentive to create credibility in-
terests.  A strategic president could decide to declare “red lines” in or-
der to build for herself the constitutional authority necessary to enforce 
those “red lines” in the future.61 
While conscientious executive branch lawyering could obviously 
stop the country from sliding down this slippery slope, there is none-
theless a risk that future OLC opinions will expand credibility to en-
compass such situations.62  Indeed, the Syria case suggests that the 
“national interests” prong is generally subject to slippage.63  The U.N. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 58 See U.N. Charter art. 2, 42, 51. 
 59 Press Conference, President Bill Clinton (Mar. 18, 1999), available at http://www.cnn.com 
/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/03/19/clinton.presser/transcript.html. 
 60 Indeed, military action in Vietnam was in part justified based on treaty commitments to 
SEATO.  See Vietnam Opinion, supra note 53. 
 61 See Matthew C. Waxman, The Power to Threaten War, 123 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2014) 
(manuscript at 25–26), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2316777. 
 62 Compare JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 32-39, 79-80, 114-76 (2009) (ar-
guing that Executive Branch lawyers can provide meaningful constraints), with BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 87–119 (2010) (arguing 
the opposite). 
 63 It is beyond the scope of this Essay to assess whether the “national interests” prong is gener-
ally too vague and amorphous to provide any serious constraint. 
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Security Council did not authorize action in Syria and the Obama 
Administration did not claim that U.S. persons or property were at 
risk.  Still, President Obama seemed confident he could act without 
congressional authorization.  Professor Harold Koh has offered a de-
fense of the use of force in Syria, absent prior congressional authoriza-
tion.  Citing the Bosnia (1995) and Libya (2011) opinions, he identifies 
“promoting regional stability and preventing destruction of the near-
century-old ban on chemical weapons” as sufficient national inter-
ests.64  It is striking, however, that the latter interest is not referenced 
specifically in either of the opinions Koh cites.  It is also worth noting 
that Koh’s argument is not a credibility argument, as it is defined here.  
The literature in political science — and the argument here — is about 
the credibility of threats, not the robustness of international norms 
(even if the word “credibility” is used to describe robustness).  There 
may be non-credibility reasons to enforce international norms and one 
could debate whether those reasons are sufficient to justify unilateral 
presidential action,65 but the point here is simply to bury credibility 
arguments.  Given the possibility of slippage from current doctrine, 
credibility arguments are a loaded gun, ready to be fired by hawkish 
presidents who have willing executive branch lawyers. 
A better approach would be for OLC to simply eliminate credibility 
from the “national interests” that justify presidential power to use 
force, in the absence of congressional authorization.  This is not to say 
that credibility could not be used in rhetoric or as a policy justification 
(although its use should probably be viewed with skepticism, given the 
political science research).  Rather, the credibility justification is suffi-
ciently problematic that presidents should have to get congressional 
authorization to use force first.66  Note also that removing credibility 
arguments from constitutional doctrine would not eliminate the United 
Nations from legal debates about the use of force.  Security Council 
authorizations are still required as a matter of international law (out-
side self-defense).  And if the United States wants to act outside of that 
constraint, presidents would still have an incentive to obtain U.N. au-
thorization to build support in domestic and international public opin-
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 64 Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part I: Political 
Miscues and U.S. Law), JUST SECURITY (Sept. 26, 2013, 4:30 AM), http://justsecurity.org/2013 
/09/26/koh-syria. 
 65 Constructivists, for example, might argue that norms exert weight in international affairs, 
and that these norms might therefore be an important “national interest” worthy of military en-
forcement.  For a discussion of constructivism, see NICHOLAS GREENWOOD ONUF, WORLD OF 
OUR MAKING (1989); and ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS (1999). 
 66 For a discussion of the consequences congressional authorization might have on shaping the 
president’s ability to threaten force, see Matthew C. Waxman, Syria, Threats of Force, and Con-
stitutional War Powers, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 297 (2013).  
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ion.  Even more indirectly, of course, presidents could always argue 
that the U.N. Security Council’s authorization provides a signal of 
how important the underlying policy issues are.  But for purposes of 
constitutional authority, presidents would have to argue that they have 
new independent authorities to use force (such as enforcing U.N. reso-
lutions or supporting international norms), resurrect legal arguments 
about the Take Care Clause and collective security treaties, or take 
their case to Congress — not rely on the questionable interest in the 
United Nations or the country’s “credibility.” 
CONCLUSION 
Credibility arguments are everywhere in foreign policy.  From 
Truman to Reagan to Obama, presidents have argued that force was 
necessary not just to advance concrete interests but to preserve credi-
bility.  Constitutional lawyers have not been immune to these argu-
ments, with executive branch legal opinions identifying the credibility 
of the United Nations as a national interest that justifies presidential 
authority to use force, absent prior congressional approval.  However, 
political scientists have demonstrated that in the context of military 
threats, credibility arguments are logically problematic and have little 
historical support. Constitutional lawyers should not rely on these 
faulty foundations to justify unilateral presidential war powers. 
